Contrary to the main narrative, french parliamentarians are not only talking about the budget. Every year, they also revisit a familiar theme: an authoritarian drift, marked by increased security, surveillance, and censorship. After several months of relative inactivity, and with upcoming municipal elections in which these issues may carry political weight, the number of debated security-oriented bills is rising. This provides an opportunity to take stock of the issues currently under discussion in the French Parliament.  It is no secret that decisions taken in the French Parliament can have a global impact, particularly within the EU, where countries often look to one another for precedent when justifying controversial legislation. 2030 OLYMPIC GAMES : POSTPONING THE APPROVAL OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE ALGORITHMS. In may 2025, the government presented a bill to the Senate in order to organize the 2030 winter Olympics in the French Alps. The first relevant provision in this law: the postponement of the authorization of algorithmic video surveillance until 2027. As a reminder, a 2024 law concerning the Paris Olympic Games authorized live behavioral recognition tools in public spaces. Despite a questionable overview of the usefulness of this technology, the government shows no intention of halting it and is ready to use the 2030 Olympics as a pretext to continue experimentation (together with the security industry) until 2027. We have a dedicated article on this topic. This bill also plans on adding a new regime of prohibition regarding the right to appear in public space during major events : the ministry considers that the current framework (the “MICAS” about administrative control and surveillance measures regarding individuals1) is not coercive enough to fulfill their needs. These new prohibitions will allow state prefects to be able to ban an individual from attending any public event, without judicial approval, nor a specific criminal necessity. These measures have been introduced in by a law on narcotic trafficking in June 2025. The 2030 Olympic Games law aims extending this to “any person for whom there are serious reasons to believe that their behavior poses a particularly serious threat to public security.”. It is difficult to make it more vague and more sweeping. And where do we stand? This bill was adopted by the Senate in May 2025 and by the National Assembly in January 2026. The text will most likely be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which will assess whether the law violates human rights and liberties. If the Council is not seized, the text will be implemented on march 2026.  FACILITATING THE USE OF AUTOMATED SYSTEMS THAT DETECTS LICENSE PLATES. Automatic License Plate Recognition system (ALPR, or LAPI in french) are used by the Customs and police authorities. This technology helps the authorities mostly in detecting car license plates. In October 2025 a bill was proposed to relax the use of such systems.  These measures have multiplied in across French cities for the past decade and are linked with street and toll cameras. Such deployment constitutes mass surveillance, it enables the identification of license plates and therefore the car owners themselves in public space during their daily lives.  Same reason to justify its extension : the tools are practical but too limited under the current framework. The proposition (most likely influenced by the ministry, or security lobbies) wants to extend the end results that can justify the use of such technologies, extend the time in which the data can be kept as well as easing the transmission of said data among different authorities.  And where do we stand ? Currently, the proposition has been adopted by the Senate on December 2025 and is sent to the National Assembly, the voting date is not planned yet. EXTENDING THE POWERS OF MUNICIPAL POLICE AND RURAL GUARDS A bill project presented by the interior ministry plans on extending the powers of municipal police and rural guards.  Said authorities will be given prerogatives on the use of aforementioned ALPR technologies, authorization to use surveillance drones, pedestrian cameras, authority to charge fines for misdemeanors (whose number is on the rise mostly in substance use cases). The bill also enables the regions to fund local security equipment. ( A demand of Valérie Pécresse, a french representative who risks here “Security Shield” be rejected by the courts. ) The impact of this bill project is quiet massive for human rights and liberties, as these agents also gain power in identity control. We will be quick in being up to date about its details. It should be noted that this is part of a continuing trend, particularly since the so-called “Global Security” law: a shift of police powers toward agents who are increasingly less trained and less public : judicial police officers, municipal police, rural wardens, and private security personnel. And where do we stand? The text was adopted by the Senate in October 2025 and was submitted to the National Assembly as of February 11, 2026. The date of its vote has not yet been scheduled EXPANDING THE SUPERVISORY POWERS OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRATIONS. Again, this is a bill that was first presented to the Senate. According to the ministry, its goal is to enforce measures and detect “fiscal and social fraud.” We have written extensively on this topic (here): in this context, we criticize the extension of access, by numerous social administration officers, to large-scale data, including files on airline passengers and telephone communications. This bill is yet another example of the unfortunate proliferation, over the past 20 years, of mass surveillance and control in the name of “combating social fraud”. And where do we stand ? The bill have been adopted in November 2025 by the Senate, and will be voted around 24th to 27th February 2026. PROHIBITION OF SOCIAL MEDIA A bill presented by the government aims at prohibiting social media for people under the age of 15. This bill, introduced by parliamentarian Laure Miller with the support of the French government, seeks to ban individuals under the age of 15 from creating or using social media accounts. Additionally, it would require all social media platforms to implement mandatory age verification for every user, ensuring that underage individuals cannot access these services. The Conseil d’Etat (State Counsel) have given a negative opinion about the text, but the government and the president Macron is strongly in favor of these measures.  And where do we stand ? The bill was voted on by the French National Assembly on January 26–27, 2026 and is scheduled to be considered by the Senate in the near future. If it is approved, the law is expected to come into effect in September 2026.  Among all the new bills currently being considered in France, this one stands out as particularly likely to influence other countries especially with the rise of hateful content on social media. AUTOMATED SURVEILLANCE IN SUPERMARKETS The latest item in this seemingly endless list is automated surveillance in stores. This is a bill proposed by EPR deputy Paul Midy, one of the leading advocates of the “French Tech”, France’s ecosystem of young, innovative digital startups. The idea is simple: legalize algorithmic video surveillance in supermarkets. In reality, this serves the interests of the French security industry, which not only seeks to deploy its tools in public spaces but also inside supermarkets. This is exactly what Veesion has been attempting for several years, claiming that its technology can detect behaviors such as theft. These companies face a major obstacle: it is currently illegal. This is not only our opinion but is also stated from multiple sources, the CNIL, the Conseil d’État, and other authorities, all of whom have confirmed that such use is prohibited. In other words, there is no real debate, even though Veesion has never been sanctioned and continues to receive financial support (for more information, click here). Fortunately for them, Paul Midy is attempting to make this technology legal by proposing to incorporate it into the Code of Interior Security. Where do we stand ? So far, Paul Midy’s bill on automated store surveillance has been approved by the Law Commission and debated in public session at the National Assembly on February 2, 2026. It will face a second public debate session on Monday 16th, February 2026 (the day this translation is being written).  As we can see, the Parliament and the government are quietly greasing the path toward authoritarianism: more surveillance, more censorship, fewer judges… While this list may seem frightening, it also gives us dizzying perspective on how little we can do, both to track these bills and report on the debates, and to try, in any meaningful way, to oppose them.  However, the inventory is not completed : the interior ministry wants to deploy a bill project on “daily security” (even though the text seems to be limited for “illegal street stunts”, it risks of being a legislative vehicle that will bring other dangerous measures, such as Algorithmic video surveillance) and continues to implement Islamophobic measures whenever they can. This article was translated by volunteers in our Matrix group, thanks to Ismail1071 ! 1. We did a livestream about this, you can see it here. ︎

In November 2023, La Quadrature du Net, Access Now, ARTICLE 19, European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), European Digital Rights (EDRi) and Wikimedia France filed a complaint against the French decree implementing the European Union’s (EU) Regulation on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (TCO, also known as “TERREG”). The goal was to obtain the annulment of this dangerous regulation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for its incompatibility with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Unfortunately, in a decision released on Monday, the French supreme administrative court, the Conseil d’État, rejected the organisations’ arguments and their request to refer the case to the CJEU. It is an extremely disappointing outcome for two main reasons. First, the French court illegitimately appropriated the legal debate over the TCO regulation’s compatibility with EU primary law. This matter should, however, be addressed at the EU level. According to the EU Treaties, the CJEU is the primary jurisdiction responsible for ruling on the legality of EU acts – which was the organisations’ main request. By carrying out its own legality assessment, the French court is de facto preventing the CJEU from exercising its exclusive competences. Second, the decision also means that law enforcement authorities across the EU can continue to use the excessive censorship powers under the TCO Regulation for the foreseeable future. Since the proposal was first published in 2018, the organisations that challenged the TCO Regulation have consistently voiced concerns about potential violations of fundamental rights due to its inadequate safeguards. Looking at the data available on the regulation implementation, there are concerning indications that some Member States may be using TERREG it as a political tool to suppress certain types of online expression. For example, of all 349 removal orders issued in the EU between June 2022 and April 2024, 249 were issued by German authorities following the events of October 7th in Israel. This is highly alarming given the increasing crackdown in Germany on freedom of expression and on freedom of assembly and association, targeting those speaking up for Palestinian rights (including protest bans, cancellations of events, suppression of student-led initiatives, etc.). The organisations insist on the urgent need to remove the TERREG disproportionate censorship powers out of police authorities’ hands and to protect people’s ability to freely express themselves online, especially in a context of shrinking civic space across the whole continent. They commit to seek other litigation opportunities to obtain the CJEU’s review of the legality of the TCO Regulation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- La Quadrature du Net (LQDN), promotes and defends fundamental freedoms in the digital world. Through its advocacy and litigation activities, it fights against censorship and surveillance, questions how the digital world and society influence each other, and works for a free, decentralised and empowering Internet. The European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL) is a non-governmental organisation working on creating legal and policy environments that enable individuals, movements and organisations to exercise and protect their civic freedoms. Access Now defends and extends the digital rights of people and communities at risk. It defends a vision of technology that is compatible with fundamental rights, including freedom of expression online. European Digital Rights (EDRi) is the largest European network of NGOs, experts, advocates and academics working to defend and advance human rights in the digital era across the continent. ARTICLE 19 works for a world where all people everywhere can freely express themselves and actively engage in public life without fear of discrimination, by working on two interlocking freedoms: the Freedom to Speak, and the Freedom to Know. Wikimedia France is the French branch of the Wikimedia movement. It promotes the free sharing of knowledge, in particular through Wikimedia projects, such as the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, and helps to defend freedom of expression, particularly online.

In the midst of the media uproar over drug trafficking, a law on “drug trafficking” is passing through Parliament. In reality, this text does not only apply to the sale of narcotics and leads to a heavy reinforcement of the surveillance capacities of the intelligence and judicial police. It is one of the most repressive and dangerous texts of recent years. This law could notably give even more powers to repress militant actions. This bill was adopted unanimously in the Senate, with the support of the Socialists, the Ecologists and the Communists, and will now be discussed in the National Assembly. La Quadrature du Net is calling for urgent mobilization to raise awareness of the dangers of this text and to push left-wing parties to reject it. On this page, you will find a set of resources and tools to help you understand this law and convince your elected representatives to mobilize: * The so-called “Drug Trafficking” law undermines the protection of encrypted messaging services (such as Signal or WhatsApp) by requiring the implementation of backdoors for the police and intelligence services. * By modifying the legal regime for organized crime, applicable in other cases, this law does not only apply to drug trafficking. It can even be used to surveil activists. * The safe-deposit box, a provision of the law, makes secret the documents in a file detailing the use of surveillance techniques during an investigation. This violates the right to defend oneself and prevents the public from knowing the extent of the surveillance capabilities of the judicial police. * The text provides for authorizing the police to remotely activate the microphones and cameras of fixed and mobile connected devices (computers, telephones, etc.) to spy on individuals. * It extends the authorization to use “black boxes”, a technique for analyzing data from all our communications and exchanges on the Internet for the purpose of “fighting delinquency and organized crime”. * The police will be able to tighten its policy of censoring Internet content by extending it to publications related to the use and sale of drugs. The risks of abuse of freedom of expression are therefore amplified. SUMMARY OF THE LAW IN VIDEO PIPHONE: CHOOSE WHICH MP TO CALL Some progressive elected representatives have bought into this narrative and this dangerous security escalation. In the Senate, the Green, Communist and Socialist groups voted in favor of this text. We believe that they must be made to face their responsibility by denouncing the dangers of this law. With our tool, you can contact them directly to send them the arguments and resources shared on this page. It is also possible to try to convince the deputies of Together for the Republic and Modem to vote against the most dangerous measures of this bill. You can call them all week and if possible on Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays, when they are not in the chamber. You will probably have an assistant on the phone and that’s okay! Feel free to talk to them, and then ask them to relay your opinion to their MP. Thank you to everyone who is putting their energy into opposing this umpteenth security crackdown, and well done to those who had the courage to contact their MPs! <3 IN DETAIL: WHAT DOES THE PROPOSED LAW PROVIDE FOR? – AMENDMENT OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME REGIME This law significantly strengthens the organized crime regime, which does not only concern drug trafficking. This legal framework was created twenty years ago to target, in theory, mafia networks by providing specific rules that derogate from common law. In particular, they allow the police to use surveillance techniques that are much broader and more intrusive than normal (wiretapping, IMSI-catchers, bugging, data capture, etc.). The scope of the offenses covered by the organized crime regime is defined in a list of the code of criminal procedure, which has grown steadily over the years, affecting more people and situations. In particular, it covers criminal association and a number of offenses and crimes committed by “organized gangs”, these classifications being increasingly used to prosecute activists. This was particularly the case during the movement of the pursue an activist fighting against the construction of administrative detention centers. To legitimize the extension of supposedly limited measures, the government and parliamentarians are using sensationalist discourse to address the issue of drug trafficking, which is not new and has known other solutions than the “all-repressive” approach. This is not insignificant. By giving the fight against drug trafficking an exceptional dimension, they are trying to justify the need to resort to extraordinary means that are extremely detrimental to our freedoms. In this respect, they are following the legislative pattern used in recent years in the fight against terrorism, which has allowed for the establishment of very significant derogations from the functioning of the institutions that have gone far beyond terrorism. – SECRET POLICE SURVEILLANCE The law prevents people from knowing how they are being monitored, which is an unprecedented and very serious attack on the founding principles of the French judicial system, which are the right to defend oneself and the principle of adversarial proceedings. Thus a measure known as the “safe file” or “separate report” would make it possible to separate from the criminal file the reports related to the implementation of surveillance techniques. These reports will only be accessible to investigators under the control of the prosecutor or the investigating judge, preventing lawyers and the persons concerned from reading and discussing them and thus from detecting potential illegalities. This will also deprive the public of the opportunity to know the extent of the surveillance capabilities of the judicial police and will facilitate abuses in the use of highly intrusive techniques, such as spyware or the compromising of devices. The senators amended the text to destroy the confidentiality of encrypted messaging services such as Signal or WhatsApp. The law stipulates that communication services are obliged to introduce access – a “backdoor” – for the benefit of the police and intelligence services, under penalty of heavy sanctions. This would create an unprecedented breach in end-to-end encryption technology, exploitable by both states and malicious actors. Such a measure is extremely dangerous. As reiterated by numerous institutions, including ANSSI and the European Data Protection Board has been warning that this would weaken the level of protection for all communications and threaten the confidentiality of all our exchanges. For years, we have been defending the right to encryption. You can read our position from 2017 here. – REMOTE ACTIVATION OF CONNECTED OBJECTS This law provides for a new escalation in surveillance by continuing the legalization of spyware (such as NSO-Pegasus or Paragon). It thus authorizes the police to remotely activate the microphones and cameras of fixed and mobile connected devices, such as computers or telephones, to spy on people. This technique relies on compromising computer systems by using flaws in connected devices. Proposed by Eric Dupont-Moretti in 2023 in a law on judicial reform, this surveillance measure was partially censored by the Constitutional Council. It is reproduced here with slight modifications, while the urgency would be to ban this type of surveillance, as it poses dangers to democratic balances and individual freedoms. – EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE POWERS AND BLACK BOXES Intelligence services would also see their powers strengthened with this law. On the one hand, the exchange of information between so-called “second circle” services (for which intelligence is only part of their mission, particularly within the police and national gendarmerie) is in principle very limited. It would be facilitated here by the removal of the need for authorization, and this well beyond the sole perimeter of drug trafficking. On the other hand, the law broadens the scope of application of the “black boxes” to the purpose of “fighting delinquency and organized crime.” This intelligence technique analyzes the data of all our communications and data retrieved from the internet via algorithms under the pretext of “detecting” new suspects. Since their creation in 2015, – Internet censorship The law will allow the police – via the Pharos service – to censor any content on the internet that it considers illegal in connection with an offense relating to drug trafficking. These are very broad prerogatives that are in addition to an already very significant capacity for administrative censorship. This possibility of requiring the withdrawal of publications without the intervention of a judge had initially been authorized for child criminal content before being extended to terrorism. This desire to lock down the internet can only lead to abuse in view of the volume of content concerned and the extra-judicial framework of this censorship, without really having an impact on the social problem of drug use, which is based on many other factors. – AND OTHER MEASURES So far, we have mentioned the most worrying measures, but unfortunately this law contains many other security extensions applying to “organized crime”, which, as we know, concerns many more situations than drug trafficking: IMSI-catchers in private places, the power of the prefect to ban people from “appearing” in a place, the use of drones in prisons, compulsory cameras in ports, a new broad and poorly defined offense of “participation in a criminal organization”…